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June, 1954
TAX ASPECTS OF PROPERTY SETTLEMENTS
AND ALIMONY IN DIVORCE*
J. NELSON YOUNG f
In representing a client in a divorce settlement, an attorney
must be fully cognizant of the tax incidents of the financial ar-
rangements agreed upon by the parties or imposed by court decree.
Failure to consider the tax consequences may materially jeopard-
ize the financial benefits secured for the wife or substantially
increase the cost of the settlement assumed by the husband. It
is the scope of this paper to outline the principal tax factors to
be considered in consummating the financial settlement incident
to the divorce or separation.
At the outset, an example may serve to demonstrate the sub-
stantial burdens imposed upon the respective parties if the tax
consequences are overlooked.' Assume that a husband having
net taxable income of $16,000 is obligated to pay his divorced
wife $6,000 per year. If these payments are not taxable to the
wife, the husband obtains no deduction and his tax will total
$5,200 leaving a net income after taxes of $10,800. The wife, of
course, will enjoy the full benefit of the $6,000 and will not be com-
pelled to discount the amount received to allow for payment of
income taxes. On the other hand, if these payments are taxable
as alimony to the wife, her tax will approximate $1,048 and the
net amount available for her living expenses will be reduced ac-
cordingly. The husband, in this case, will gain a deduction in an
equivalent amount and his tax will be approximately half the
amount otherwise payable, namely, $2,640 rather than $5,200.
Anticipation of the tax costs by the attorney for either party may
result in shifting the tax incidents to avoid adverse tax conse-
quences to his client.
BACKGROUND OF PRESENT ALIMONY PROVISIONS
Our first concern in the tax problems of divorce is the treat-
ment of continuing payments made by the husband to the wife
which are in the nature of alimony. In an early case it was held
that alimony received by the divorced wife did not constitute tax-
able income within the statutory definition of the term, but rather
a non-deductible personal expense of the husband incurred in dis-
charging an obligation incident to the marriage relationship. 2
This was the state of the law until the Revenue Act of 1942 was
* Reprinted from the April, 1954, issue of the South Dakota Bar Journal.
j-Of Urbana; Professor of Law, University of Illinois. Chairman, ISBA
Section on Federal Taxation.
' The figures used in this illustration are approximate and are based on
1954 tax rates.
Gould v. Gould, 245 U. S. 151 (1917).
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adopted. Congress, motivated by the substantial increase in sur-
tax rates, deemed it inequitable to continue the established rule
regarding the treatment of alimony and determined that these
payments should thereafter be taxed as income of the wife and
allowed as a deduction to the husband. This was accomplished by
adding sections 22(k), 23(u) and 171 to the code and by amend-
ing section 22(b) (2) relating to insurance and annuities. Section
22(k) prescribes the conditions prerequisite to the taxation of
alimony payments as income of the wife. If the payments fall
within these statutory provisions, the husband is allowed a page 3
deduction by section 23(u).
The constitutionality of treating alimony as income under
the Sixteenth Amendment has been sustained in a recent decision.
In the Gould case,3 it had been assumed that the treatment of all
money as income was a matter of statutory definition and that
there were no constitutional limitations or restrictions. The Court
of Claims took this position in its recent decision and the Supreme
Court denied certiorari.
4
By the terms of the statute, alimony either as income or as a
deduction is placed strictly on a cash basis. The fact hat the tax-
payer regularly follows .the accrual method of reporting income
does not alter the situation-alimony payments are taxed only in
the year of receipt and are deductible only in the year of payment. '5
STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS
To qualify under the provisions of section 22(k) so that the
payments will be taxable as income of the wife and deductible as
a page 3 deduction by the husband, certain technical requirements
must be met. For convenience these are summarized as follows:
(1) there must be a decree of divorce or separation;
(2) the payments must be in satisfaction of an obligation im-
posed or incurred "because of the marital or family rela-
tionship;"
(3) the payments by the husband must be in discharge of an
obligation imposed by decree, or incurred "under a writ-
ten instrument incident to such divorce or separation;"
(4) the payments must be "periodic" and not installment
payments of a principal sum; and finally,
(5) the payments must not be for the support of minor chil-
dren.
It is also provided that periodic payments attributable to prop-
erty transferred on trust or otherwise shall be taxed to the wife
and excluded from the husband's income.
'Supra, note 2.4 Mahana v. United States, 88 F. Supp. 285 (Ct. C1. 1950), cert. den. 339
U. S. 978 (1950).
'Int. Rev. Code, §§22(k), 23(u); Reg. 118, §39.22 (k)-1(a)(6) (1953).
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REQUIREMENT OF A DECREE OF DIVORCE OR SEPARATION*
A prior decree of divorce or legal separation is the sine qua
non for treatment of periodic payments as alimony under the Code
provisions. In the absence of a prior decree, the payments made
by the husband will not qualify even though clearly intended for
the support of the wife. This requirement is strictly enforced by
the courts as evidenced by the following instances in which the
payments have been held to fall outside the provisions of the
statute.
(1) payments under a voluntary separation agreement;6
(1947).
(2) payments pursuant to court order enforcing a voluntary
separation agreement;7
(3) payments pursuant to court order enforcing the hus-
band's legal obligation to support his wife and family ;s
(4) payments of alimony pendente lite;9
(5) payments made prior to a decree even though subse-
quently covered by entry of a decree nunc pro tunc;10 and
(6) payments under an interlocutory decree.1'
In all these cases the decisions turned on the fact that there
had been no decree of divorce or legal separation prior to the time
the payments were made. It should be noted that where a quali-
fying decree of divorce or separation is lacking, the parties may
still file a joint return as husband and wife. 12 This was recently
permitted in a case where an interlocutory decree had not become
final prior to the end of the taxable year.
13
Anomalous as it may seem, universal validity is not required
of a prior decree. Thus it has been held that payments under a
separation agreement entered into prior to a foreign decree were
deductible by the husband even though the foreign divorce had
been held null and void by the domiciliary state.14 The Bureau has
* Section 71 of the proposed Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (H.R. 8300,
83d Cong., 2d Sess. would abolish the present requirement of a prior judicial
decree of divorce or separation. Support payments under a voluntary separa-
tion agreement would be treated as alimony taxable to the wife and deductible
by the husband where the parties do not file a joint return.
6Smith v. Comm'r, 168 F. (2d) 446 (2d Cir. 1948), affirming 6 T.C.M. 1323
'Terrell v. Comm'r, 179 F. (2d) 838 (7th Cir. 1950), cert. den. 340 U. S.
822 (1950).
6 Frank J. Kalchthaler, 7 T.C. 625 (1946); Angelo Frascone, 8 T.C.M. 377
(1949).
9 Reg. 118, §39.22 (k)-1, Example (1); George D. Wick, 7 T.C. 723 (1946),
aff'd per curiam, 161 F. (2d) 732 (3d Cir. 1947); Robert A. McKinney, 16 T.C.
916 (1951).
,0 Daine v. Comm'r, 168 F. (2d) 449 (2d Cir. 1948), affirming 9 T.C. 47 (1947).
"Alice H. Evans, 19 T.C. 1102 (1953).
12 Int. Rev. Code, §51(b) (5) (B).
13Marriner S. Eccles, 19 T.C. 1049 (1953).
14 Feinberg v. Comm'r, 198 F. (2d) 260 (3rd Cir. 1952), reversing, 16 T.C.
1485 (1951). Here the parties, residents of New York, entered into a voluntary
separation agreement which provided for weekly support payments to the wife.
A few weeks thereafter, the husband obtained a Florida divorce with service
by publication. Subsequently the wife obtained a reformat.'n -f the separation
agreement and a declaratory judgment that the Florida decree was null and void.
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also ruled that it will allow a deduction for payments made by the
husband under a separation agreement incident to a Mexican di-
vorce decree where the parties resided in a jurisdiction which did
not recognize such decrees. 15
OBLIGATION IMPOSED "BECAUSE OF THE MARITAL
OR FAMILY RELATIONSHIP"
In adopting the alimony provisions, Congress studiously
avoided incorporation of the term "alimony" in the language of
the statute. As indicated in the committee reports, it was in-
tended that the statute should "produce uniformity in the treat-
ment of amounts paid in the nature of or in lieu of alimony re-
gardless of variance in the laws of different states concerning the
existence and continuance of an obligation to pay alimony." 
1
With this expression of legislative intent to rely upon, it has been
held that periodic payments for support are deductible by the
husband and taxable to the wife even though the law of the par-
ticular state does not impose upon the husband an obligation to
pay alimony.'
7
It is still necessary, however, to distinguish between payments
which are in satisfaction of property rights and those which are
in satisfaction of support rights. Payments in satisfaction of
property rights alone will not qualify as alimony payments-that
is, such payments will not be taxable as income of the wife, nor
deductible by the husband. More frequently, the agreement or de-
cree will provide for settlement of both property and support
rights in consideration of periodic payments. Unless the provi-
sions are clearly separable, periodic payments required of the hus-
band will nevertheless qualify as alimony taxable to the wife.
In a very recent case, the divorced wife claimed an interest as
a partner in her husband's business in the negotiations leading
to the divorce settlement. This claim was based upon the rendi-
tion of services in the operation of the business and an alleged
understanding that she was to be made a partner. In the settle-
ment concluded by the parties, the wife released her claim to an
interest in the business and waived her dower rights and claims
for alimony. The principal consideration for the release of these
rights was the husband's agreement to provide a home and an
automobile for her, the assignment of a 40% interest in some life
insurance policies, and the payment of $17,500 per year in equal
semi-monthly payments. The wife contended that the periodic pay-
ments were made as the purchase price of her ownership in the
business and should not be taxable to her. But the Tax Court con-
G.C.M. 25250, 1947-2 Cum. Bull. 32.
16H. R. Rep. No. 2333, 77th Cong. 1st Sess. 72 (1942), 1942-2 Cum. Bull.
372, 427; Sen. Rep. No. 1631, 77th Cong. 2d Sess. 83 (1942), 1942-2 Cum. Bull.
504, 568.
'" Tuckie G. Hesse, 7 T.C. 700 (1946); Thomas E. Hogg, 13 T.C. 361 (1949).
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cluded that taking the agreement as a whole the periodic payments
were for support and were properly taxable.
18
OBLIGATION IMPOSED BY DECREE OR WRITTEN INSTRUMENT
Section 22(k) expressly provides that the husband's obliga-
tion to make periodic payments must be imposed by decree or by
a "written instrument incident to such divorce or separation." In
the vast majority of cases, this requirement presents no difficulty
for the husband's obligation is generally imposed either by the
specific terms of the decree or by the provisions of a written in-
strument incorporated in the decree. The real difficulty with re-
spect to this requirement arises either where the agreement is made
prior to the divorce or separation and is not incorporated in the
decree, or where the parties subsequent to the divorce or separa-
tion alter or amend the husband's obligation without the benefit
of court supervision.
Consider first the situation where an agreement for periodic
payments is entered into prior to the divorce or separation, but is
not incorporated in the decree. The Tax Court has adopted the
view that in such a case the agreement is not incident to the
divorce or separation unless the parties mutually contemplated or
intended a divorce at the time the agreement was consummated. 19
The Courts of Appeals, however, have not adhered to this restric-
tive rule of construction and have held that the statute does not
require proof "that both parties jointly and positively anticipated
legal divorce or separation at the moment they signed the agree-
ment." 20 Instead, these courts have taken a much more liberal
position and have adopted the rule that the agreement shall be
considered incident to the divorce or separation if the payments
thereunder take the place of alimony or support monies which
would otherwise be due and payable.
2-
A question also arises where an agreement has been incorpo-
rated in the decree but subsequent to the divorce or separation the
parties by mutual consent alter or amend the provisions for peri-
odic payments. The trend of the recent cases is that the revised
agreement will be considered incident to the divorce or separation
provided the original agreement meets this requirement. 2 The
moral of the cases in this area points toward the advisability of
incorporating a pre-divorce agreement in the decree and of effect-
ing subsequent revisions or amendments under the supervision of
Julia Nathan, 19 T.C. 865 (1953) ; see also on this point: Floyd H. Brown,
16 T.C. 623 (1951).
"9E.g., Francis Hamer Johnson, 21 T.C. No. 42 (1953).
Izrastzoff v. Comm'r, 193 F. (2d) 625, 627 (2d Cir. 1952).
21Lerner v. Comm'r, 195 F. (2d) 296 (2d Cir. 1952),. reversing, 15 T.C. 379
(1950); Comm'r v. Miller, 199 F. (2d) 597 (9th Cir. 1952), reversing 16 T.C.
1010 (1951).
22 Smith v. Comm'r, 192 F. (2d) 841 (1st Cir. 1951), affirming 16 T.C. 639
(1951); Rowena S. Barnum, 19 T.C. 401 (1952); cf., Comm'r v. Walsh, 183 F.
(2d) 803 (D.C. Cir. 1950), affirming, 11 T.C. 1093 (1948); Comm'r v. Murray,
174 F. (2d) 816 (2d Cir. 1949), reversing, 7 T.C.M. 365 (1948).
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the divorce court. This should be the modus operandi to insure a
tax deduction for the husband.
PAYMENTS MUST BE PERIODIC
Lump Sum Payments Do Not Qualify-It is the general
scheme of the statute that the payments must be periodic to qualify
as alimony. In most cases this requirement poses no problem for
it is generally provided by agreement or decree that the husband
shall pay the wife a fixed sum per month for her support until
her death or remarriage. In that case the payments are taxable
to the wife and deductible by the husband. But there are instances
where the husband pays a fixed sum to the wife in full satisfac-
tion of his obligations. A lump sum payment clearly does not
qualify under the statute and is neither taxable to the wife nor
deductible by the husband.
23
Installment Payments of a Lump Sum-To take another vari-
ation, assume that a principal sum is established as a basis for
settlement but it is provided that payment shall be by installments.
By an exception included in section 22(k), installment payments
may qualify as alimony if the payments of the principal sum ex-
tend over a period of more than ten years from the date of the
decree or agreement. But the amount which may qualify as ali-
mony in any one year may not exceed ten per cent of the principal
obligation. From the husband's standpoint, installment payments
of a principal sum extending over a period of more than ten years
will prove advantageous since such payments will qualify as proper
tax deductions.
The statute provides that the ten year period shall be measured
from the date of the decree or instrument. In drafting an agree-
ment or decree where it is intended that the payments shall qualify
under the statutory exception, care should be taken to avoid skat-
ing too closely to the edge of the ten year period. 24
Rule of Separability and the Drafting Problem-A recent case
demonstrates the tax trap which awaits the draftsman under the
rule of separability which has been applied to agreements which
provide for installment payments. 25 The point can best be made
by illustration: Assume an agreement or decree which provides
in separate clauses substantially as follows:
(A) H shall pay W $25,000 in semi-annual installments of
$2500 for a period of five years beginning January 1,
1954; and
(B) in addition, H shall pay W $5,000 per year in equal
monthly installments for a period of 15 years beginning
January 1, 1954.
As noted later, a lump sum settlement may result in gift tax liability.
4E.g., see: Comm'r v. Blum, 187 F. (2d) 177 (7th Cir. 1951), cert. den.
342 U. S. 819 (1951).
'Estate of Frank C. Smith, 5 CCH 1953 Fed. Tax. Rep. 9616, (3d Cir.
November 13, 1953).
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The total obligation of the husband is to pay the divorced wife
$100,000 over a period of 15 years-$25,000 under clause (A) and
$75,000 under clause (B). Combining the payments under the
two clauses $10,000 is payable each year during the first five years
and $5,000 during each of the last ten years of the fifteen year
period. The payments of $10,000 per year do not exceed ten per
cent of the total obligation of the husband. But under the rule of
separability, the payments required under clause (A) will not
qualify under section 22(k) since these payments constitute in-
stallment payments of a principal sum due within a period of less
than ten years. Consequently, the husband will lose a tax deduc-
tion of $25,000. By careful draftsmanship, this result can be
avoided.
To obviate the adverse result in the foregoing case, the hus-
band's obligation should be stated in terms of a single principal
sum as follows:
(a) H shall pay W $100,000 over a period of 15 years begin-
ning January 1, 1954, in the following installments: (1)
$10,000 per year for the first five years; and (2) $5,000
per year for the last ten years.
By merging the husband's obligation into a single principal sum,
the rule of separability will be inapplicable and the payments
made during the first five years will qualify as alimony deductions
since they do not exceed ten per cent of the principal amount.
The foregoing suggestions are directed toward proper repre-
sentation of the husband. One representing the wife would, of
course, prefer the first form of separately stating the husband's
obligations since that would serve to remove $25,000 from the
wife's taxable income.
Payments for Periods Less Than Ten Years Contingent Upon
Death or Remarriage-As indicated above, installment payments
of a lump sum extending over a period of less than ten years do
not qualify as alimony payments under section 22 (k). It has been
contended, however, that if the payments are contingent upon
death or remarriage, they are periodic and are not installment
payments of a lump sum since the period is indefinite. The Tax
Court has consistently refused to bow to this argument and has
held that where the payments are for a fixed period of less than
ten years, though subject to these contingencies, they constitute
installment payments of a readily determinable fixed sum.
2-"
In two recent cases, however, the Courts of Appeals for the
Second and Third Circuits have held that the probability of re-
marriage is so uncertain and immeasurable that it serves to convert
the fixed term into an indefinite term and the payments become
"J. B. Steinel, 10 T.C. 409 (1948); Frank P. Orsatti Estate, 12 T.C. 188
(1949); Frank R. Casey, 12 T.C. 224 (1949); Harold M. Fleming, 14 T.C. 1308
(1950); Benjamin Davidson, 11 T.C.M. 1111 (1952); F. Ellsworth Baker, 17 T.C.
1610 (1952), rev'd, 205 F. (2d) 369 (2d Cir. 1953).
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periodic payments taxable to the wife and deductible by the hus-
band.27 In the light of these decisions, specified payments over a
fixed term of less than ten years qualify as alimony if the pay-
ments cease upon the wife's remarriage.
The decision of the Third Circuit in the Smith case is broad
enough to sustain the proposition that payments contingent upon
the death of either the husband or wife will constitute periodic
payments. This position seems inconsistent with the usual recog-
nition given life expectancies in determining valuation. If the
life expectancies of the two parties are at least equal to the term
for which the payments are to be made, it is reasonable to conclude
that the payments constitute installment payments of a fixed sum.
Further developments on this point-either judicial or legislative
-- can be expected.
Payments Contingent Upon the Husband's Earnings-Where
the payments for a term of less than ten years are contingent upon
the husband's earnings, the decisions are not consistent in the
treatment of such payments as periodic rather than as installment
payments of a principal sum. 28 One may, with reasonable safety,
postulate the rule, however, that if the payments to the wife vary
directly with the husband's income, the payments will be consid-
ered periodic. Assume, in a situation where the husband's earn-
ings are normally subject to considerable fluctuation, the wife is
to receive 30% of the husband's net income for a period of eight
years-but not less than $3,000 nor more than $6,000 per year.
Payments under an arrangement of this type should qualify as
periodic payments.
PAYMENTS FOR SUPPORT OF MINOR CHILDREN
By express provision in section 22(k), payments made for the
support of minor children are not deductible by the husband nor
taxable to the wife. This result clearly follows where the agree-
ment or decree expressly stipulates that a certain amount is pay-
able for support of children. 29 But where the decree or agreement
fixes a sum for support of both the wife and children without spe-
cifying the amount for each, the payments are taxable in their
entirety to the wife and are fully deductible by the husband.3
Under these circumstances, no portion of the husband's payments
may be treated as payments for the support of a child in determin-
ing the dependency credit.31 Consequently the benefit of the de-
pendency credit is made available to the wife.
Although the agreement or decree may not designate a specific
sum for support of minor children, provisions for adjustment of
11Baker v. Comm'r, 206 F. (2d) 369 (2d Cir. 1953); Estate of Frank C.
Smith, 5 CCH 1953 Fed. Tax Rep. 9616, (3d Cir. Nov. 13, 1953).
2Roland K. Young, 10 T.C. 724 (1948); John H. Lee, 10 T.C. 834 (1948);
James M. Fidler, 20 T.C. No. 149 (1953).
"Reg. 118, §39.22(k)-1(d) (1953).
"oDora H. Moitoret, 7 T.C. 640 (1946).
"Int. Rev. Code, §25(b) (3).
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the payments to be made to the wife may result in identification
of a portion of the payments as being for that purpose. To illus-
trate, assume that the wife is to receive $500 per month for the
support of herself and a minor child. Without more, the $500 is
taxable as income of the wife and is deductible by the husband as
alimony. But assume that there is a further proviso that upon
the child's reaching majority or in the event of the child's prior
death the monthly payments shall be reduced by $100. This latter
provision has the effect of identifying $100 per month as payments
for the support of the minor child.3 2 Thus the wife would be taxed
upon income of $400 per month and the husband's deduction would
be limited accordingly.
Although the husband is allowed no deduction for payments
for the support of minor children, he may be allowed a dependency
credit. The burden is upon him, however, to establish that he con-
tributed more than one-half of the support of the child or chil-
dren.3 3 This burden is a difficult one where the payments are made
to the wife who is not bound to separately account for the expendi-
ture of the funds. Where the situation is sufficiently amicable, the
wife might be persuaded to create a separate bank account so that
a detailed report of expenditure of the funds for the support of
the children will be maintained.
ALIMONY TRUSTS
Prior to the Revenue Act of 1942, income of an alimony trust
was taxable to the husband if it discharged, but did not terminate,
a continuing obligation to support the former wife.34 Under the
provisions of Section 22(k), the distributable income of a trust
created pursuant to decree or an agreement incident to the divorce
or separation is taxable to the wife and excluded from the hus-
band's income. If there is a provision for payment of an annuity
to the wife, the full amount is taxable to the wife as a periodic
payment even though the distribution is in part from corpus. 35
There are instances where the husband has created a trust for
the benefit of his wife prior to the time a divorce was contemplated.
The income of this trust may have been taxable to the husband
because it was required by the terms thereof that the income
should be distributed for the support and maintenance of his wife
(section 167), or because he retained a power of revocation (sec-
tion 166), or because he retained such powers as to bring the trust
within the scope of the Clifford doctrine (section 22(a)). In a
subsequent divorce or separation, the wife, relying upon the ben-
. The following decisions illustrate this point: Robert W. Budd, 7 T.C. 413
(1946), aff'd per curiam, 177 F. (2d) 198 (6th Cir. 1947); Leon Mandel, 8 T.C.M.
445 (1949), aff'd 185 F. (2d) 50 (7th Cir. 1950) ; Harold M. Fleming, 14 T.C.
1308 (1950).
33Richard P. Prickett, 18 T.C. 872 (1952).
" E.g., Douglas v. Willcuts, 296 U.S. 1 (1935).
"Reg. 118, §39.22(k)-1(b) (2) (1953). The annuity payments in this case




efits provided by the previously created trust, does not seek or
obtain provision for her support in the legal proceedings incident
to the divorce or separation. Under section 171, the income of the
trust will thereafter be taxed to the wife, but distributions from
principal will not constitute taxable income.
36
Consistent with the rule applicable to periodic payments by
the husband, trust income applied to the support of minor chil-
dren is taxable to the husband, not to the wife.3 7 But where the
trust income includes tax-exempt interest, the husband is entitled
to a pro-rata allocation in the determination of his taxable income. 38
As will be noted later, gift tax liability may be incurred upon
creation of an alimony trust. In addition, the trust property may
also be included in the husband's gross estate upon his death if
he retains an interest in the property or control over its ultimate
disposition.
ANNUITY IN PAYMENT OF ALIMONY
Where the wife desires support payments for the duration of
her life, a simple solution would be for the husband to purchase
an annuity contract and assign it to her. But if this were done,
the husband obtains no tax deduction for the consideration paid
for the annuity. He is deemed to have made either a lump sum
payment or, more properly, a transfer of property to provide peri-
odic payments for the wife. The wife, on the other hand, will be
fully taxed upon the annuity payments as periodic payments at-
tributable to property transferred in satisfaction of the husband's
obligation. The three per cent rule generally applicable to annui-
ties is inapplicable in this case by express statutory exception. 3"
The same result would follow if the husband assigned to the wife
an annuity limited by his own life.
The tax cost of employing an annuity can be reduced, however,
by altering the form of the settlement. Assume that the wife de-
sires an annuity of $3,000 per year which will cost $50,000. If the
husband purchases the annuity contract and assigns it to her, the
annual payments of $3,000 will be fully taxable to the wife. But
assume that the wife accepts a payment of $50,000 from the hus-
band in satisfaction of his obligation to support her. Later she
purchases an annuity with the funds provided. In this case, the
wife will be taxed each year only upon $1,500 (3% of $50,000).
Where an annuity is desired, it would be preferable for the hus-
band and wife to arrive at a cash settlement and let the wife pur-
chase the annuity after the settlement has been effected. The
husband's tax position remains the same, but the wife's tax cost
is substantially reduced.
'Int. Rev. Code, §171(a); Reg. 118, §39.171-1 (1953).
'Int. Rev. Code, §§22(k), 171(a).
'Arthur Letts, Jr., 3 T.C.M. 377 (1944).





Life insurance may be an important factor in the financial
settlement effected by the husband and wife. These transactions
may take several alternative forms, but the more common prob-
ably fall into the following patterns:
(a) the husband transfers fully paid-up policies absolutely to
the wife; or
(b) he transfers annual premium policies to the wife and con-
tinues the premium payments; or
(c) he transfers annual premium policies to the wife who as-
sumes the burden of future premium payments.
These transactions present four problems which should be
considered at this point. (1) Does the husband obtain an income
tax deduction upon the transfer of insurance policies to the wife?
(2) Do the premium payments made by the husband subsequent
to the transfer constitute taxable income to the wife so that the
husband may take a corresponding deduction? (3) Are the pro-
ceeds of the policies received upon the husband's death taxable as
income of the wife? (4) Are the proceeds of the insurance policies
includible in the husband's gross estate for purposes of the Federal
estate tax? A gift tax question also arises with respect to the
transfer of the policies, but this point is covered in connection
with property settlements.
Transfer of Policies and Payment of Premiums-The transfer
of a partially paid or a fully paid-up policy to the wife will not
provide the husband with an alimony deduction since this consti-
tutes a lump sum payment or a transfer of property for the pur-
pose of providing the wife with periodic payments--depending
upon the settlement provisions of the contract. Conversely the
wife does not realize income upon the transfer of the policy.
Whether the premium payments made by the husband subse-
quent to the transfer are taxable as income of the wife and de-
ductible by him as alimony turns upon the nature of the wife's
interest in the policies. If she takes only a contingent or security
interest to protect her in the event of the husband's premature
death-for example, where the policies are payable to her only if
she survives her husband-the premiums are not taxable as ali-
mony income and the husband will not be allowed a deduction.
40
But if she takes an absolute property interest in the policies and
is free to change the beneficiary, borrow upon the policies, aad
surrender the policies for their cash surrender value, the premiums
are taxable to her as alimony income and are deductible by the
husband. 4 . The distinction rests upon the proposition that the
wife must actually or constructively receive the periodic payments
"Estate of Frank C. Smith, 5 CCH 1953 Fed. Tax Rep. 9616 (3d Cir. No-
vember 19, 1953); Seligmann v. Comm'r, 5 CCH 1953 Fed. Tax Rep. 9580 (7th
Cir. October 19, 1953); Lilian Bond Smith, 21 T.C. No. 40 (1953); William J.
Gardner, 14 T.C. 1445 (1950), aff'd per curiam, 191 F. (2d) 857 (6th Cir. 1951).
OLemuel A. Carmichael, 14 T.C. 1356 (1950); Anita Quinby Stewart, 9
T.C. 195 (1947).
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made by the husband. Where her interest is merely a contingent
interest, this requirement is not met.
Proceeds of Insurance as Income of Wife-The income tax
treatment of the proceeds of life insurance contracts received by
the wife following the husband's death is uncertain. The language
of the regulations is sufficiently broad to indicate that if the pro-
ceeds are received in periodic (installment) payments, they are tax-
able to the wife as alimony income in any event.42 This result does
not seem unreasonable where the wife's interest under the policies
was security against her husband's premature death. In that case
the premiums paid by the husband would not have been taxable
to her and the policies would serve to continue periodic payments
for her after his death. But where the wife held an absolute prop-
erty interest in the policies prior to her husband's death so that
the premiums paid by the husband were taxable as alimony in-
come, the result is harsh indeed. In that case, no deduction would
be allowed against the proceeds for the amount of premiums taxed
to her as income.
The regulations imply that the proceeds may not be taxed as
income in any respect if paid in a lump sum. A question still re-
mains, however, as to whether the wife will be considered a trans-
feree for value so that she will be taxed upon the proceeds to the
extent that the amount received is in excess of her cost basis
where she took an absolute interest in the policies prior to his
death. There is considerable need for legislative clarification in
this area.
Inclusion of Proceeds in Husband's Estate-Proceeds of the
insurance policies will be included in the husband's gross estate
under the Federal estate tax in either of two situations. If the
proceeds serve to liquidate an obligation to continue alimony pay-
ments to his wife-for example, where the wife's interest is a
security interest-they are includible in the same manner as if
they were payable to the executor. But an off-setting deduction
may be taken as a claim against the husband's estate. 43 The pro-
ceeds are also includible in proportion to the premiums paid by
the husband where there was a transfer of the policy to the wife
in the divorce settlement and the transfer constituted a gift for
purposes of the gift tax.44
PROPERTY SETTLEMENTS
Gift Tax Consequences-The first question to arise with re-
spect to a transfer of property or lump sum payment of cash in
a divorce settlement is the applicability of the gift tax. This turns
on whether the transfer is for an adequate and full consideration
in money or money's worth. There is no specific provision in the
gift tax regarding the treatment of transfers made in considera-
'Reg. 118, §§39.22 (b) (2) -4; 39.22 (k) -1(b) (1) (1953).
SEstate of Silas Mason, 43 B.T.A. 813 (1941).
"Int. Rev. Code, §811(g) (3).
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tion of the relinquishment of marital rights. But section 812 (b)
of the estate tax provides that relinquishment of "dower" or "other
marital rights in the decedent's property or estate" shall not be
treated as consideration in money or money's worth in determin-
ing allowable claims founded upon a promise or agreement. Ap-
plying the rule of pari materia, the Supreme Court has adopted
this restriction in construing section 1002 of the gift tax in the
determination of taxable inter vivos transfers of property in satis-
faction of a spouse's dower rights.
45
The rules now applicable to property settlements incident to
divorce or separation are these: (1) If a transfer is made pursu-
ant to an agreement not incorporated in a decree, there is a tax-
able gift to the extent that the transfer is made in satisfaction of
the wife's dower or other property rights.46 (2) If, however, the
transfer is made pursuant to decree or an agreement which has
been incorporated in a decree, there is no taxable gift regardless
of the purpose of the transfer. 47 A transfer in this case is deemed
to be one in satisfaction of a decretal obligation and is not made
pursuant to a promise or agreement. Consequently the require-
ment of an adequate and full consideration in money or money's
worth is not applicable.
The status of the law in this area leads to this conclusion. To
avoid imposition of a gift tax upon a property settlement, with-
hold transfer of the property until the settlement agreement has
been adopted by the divorce court and incorporated in the divorce
decree.
Income Tax Consequences-A transfer of property pursuant
to a property settlement may also result in the realization of tax-
able income by the husband. This will follow where the value of
the wife's property and support rights exceeds the cost basis of
the property transferred. 48 Assume for example that the wife has
agreed to accept $150,000 in full satisfaction of her property and
support rights and is willing to take securities held by her husband
which are currently valued at that figure. The cost basis of the
securities in his hands is only $50,000. The husband will realize
a taxable gain of $100,000 upon the transfer.
Subsequent to the settlement a question arises as to the cost
basis of the property acquired by the wife. Has she acquired the
property by gift so that she succeeds to her husband's basis, or
has she acquired the property by purchase? Although the trans-
action may have constituted a gift under the gift tax, it is deemed
a purchase and sale for income tax purposes. Consequently the
basis of the property in the wife's hands is its fair market value
Comm'r v. Wemyss, 324 U. S. 303 (1945); Merrill v. Fahs, 324 U. S. 308
(1945); Harris v. Comm'r, 340 U. S. 106 (1950).
E. T. 19, 1946-2 Cum. Bull. 166.
41 Harris v. Comm'r, 340 U. S. 106 (1950).
48 Comm'r v. Halliwell, 131 F. (2d) 642 (2d Cir. 1942), cert. den., 319 U. S.
741 (1943) ; Comm'r v. Mesta, 123 F. (2d) 986 (3d Cir. 1941), cert. den., 316
U. S. 695 (1942).
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:at the date of the transfer or the amount of the liquidated obliga-
tion satisfied by the transfer.
49
INCOME TAXES UPON ALIMONY INCOME OF THE WIFE
The taxability of periodic payments to the wife is governed
by the conditions imposed under section 22(k). If the payments
do not meet these requirements, the wife's erroneous inclusion of
the amounts in her taxable income does not validate a deduction
taken by her husband. 50 Similarily, the wife's agreement or obli-
gation under a decree to pay income taxes upon payments received
from her husband does not render the payments taxable to her
or deductible by him if they do not qualify under section 22 (k). 1
Often it will be provided that the husband shall pay the in-
come taxes assessed with respect to the payments made to the wife
so that she will be guaranteed a tax-free income. This will not
serve to exclude the payments from her taxable income if they
are otherwise taxable under section 22 (k) .52 The additional amount
paid by the husband to defray the wife's income tax constitutes
additional taxable income of the wife.53 In a recent ruling the
Bureau has obviated the problem of a "tax on a tax on a tax" by
ruling that the amount agreed upon by the parties as payable by
the husband in liquidation of this obligation will determine the




Deduction of legal expenses incurred by the respective parties
in connection with divorce or separation and the financial arrange-
ments incident thereto has caused considerable litigation. But by
this time the rules are fairly well established.
Paid by the Husband,-The husband may be obligated to pay
not only his own legal expenses, but also those of his wife. As a
general proposition, neither are deductible. Legal expenses in-
curred in obtaining a divorce or defending a divorce suit are per-
sonal expenses which are non-deductible under section 24(a) (1).
In recent cases it has been urged that the portion of the legal ex-
penses allocable to the financial settlement are deductible as non-
business expenses "incurred for the production or collection of
income." The Courts following the rationale of the Lykes case,,-,
40Farid-Es-Sultaneh v. Comm'r, 160 F. (2d) 812 (2d Cir. 1947); Edna W.
Gardner Trust, 20 T.C. No. 125 (1953) ; C. de Bourbon Patino, 13 T.C. 816 (1949),
aff'd, 186 F. (2d) 962 (4th Cir. 1950); Aleda N. Hall, 9 T.C. 53 (1947).
"Van Vlaanderen v. Comm'r, 175 F. (2d) 389 (3d Cir. 1949).
1 Frank R. Casey, 12 T.C. 224 (1949).
"Muriel D. Neeman, 13 T.C. 397 (1949); aff'd per curiam, 200 F. (2d) 560
(2d Cir. 1953), cert. den., 345 U. S. 956 (1953).
"Mahana v. United States, 88 F. Supp. 285 (Ct. Cl. 1950), cert. den., 339
U. S. 978 (1950).
' Mim. 6779, 1952-1 Cum. Bull. 8, as amended by IR-Mim. 51, 1953-2 Cum.
Bull. 65.
"Lykes v. United States, 343 U. S. 118 (1952) (denying a deduction under
section 23(a) (2) for legal expenses incurred in defending a gift tax deficiency).
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have rejected this argument and have disallowed the deduction on
the ground that the immediate purpose of the expenditures is to
relieve the taxpayer of liability and is not directly related to the
production or collection of income.5 6
In one case, however, the fact justified a contrary result. There
the husband was serving as president of a corporation in which
he held a controlling interest. His wife was negotiating for a
property settlement which would have required liquidation of his
stock and consequent relinquishment of control of the corporation,
loss of dividends, and probable loss of his position as president.
The court concluded that the legal expenses were allowable in these
circumstances as expenses incurred in "conserving and maintain-
ing property . . . for the production of income." 57
The wife's counsel fees which are paid by the husband are not
deductible by him as alimony payments. These expenses are not
in the nature of alimony and if they were such payments would
not qualify as periodic payments.5 8
Paid by the Wife-Legal expenses and counsel fees paid by
the wife are accorded somewhat different treatment. To the ex-
tent that they are allocable to the negotiation or creation of tax-
able alimony income, they are deductible as non-business expenses
under section 23(a) (2), being held ordinary and necessary ex-
penses incurred in the production or collection of income.5 9 The
same rule previously mentioned applies, however, to fees and ex-
penses allocable to obtaining a divorce or defending a divorce suit.
These are non-deductible personal expenses of the wife.
ALIMONY IN KIND
Payment of alimony in kind is certainly not the ordinary situ-
ation. It is conceivable, however, that under certain circumstances
the husband may furnish groceries, clothing, or fuel to his di-
vorced wife. These items would ccnstitute payments in lieu of
money and would qualify as periodic alimony payments under the
statute.
It has been held, however, that the rental value of a home
furnished by the husband to the wife rent free does not provide
an alimony deduction.60 In the particular case the wife was granted
the right to live in the family home until her death or remarriage
or until the children reached the age of 23 or left home whichever
event was the first to occur. The court concluded that there were
no periodic payments by the husband as required by statute; or,
in the alternative, that if there were periodic payments, they were
" Howard v. Comm'r, 202 F. (2d) 28 (9th Cir. 1953), aff'g 16 T.C. 147
(1951); Estate of Frank C. Smith, 5 CCH 1953 Fed. Tax Rep. 9616 (3d Cir.
November 13, 1953).
"Baer v. Comm'r, 196 F. (2d) 646 (8th Cir. 1952).
3'Baer v. Comm'r, supra, note 57; Frank J. Loverin, 10 T.C. 406 (1948).
"Barbara B. Lemond, 13 T.C. 670 (1949); Elsie B. Gale, 13 T.C. 661 (1949).
6oPappenheimer v. Allen, 164 F. (2d) 428 (5th Cir. 1947).
DICTA
June, 1954
attributable to property transferred. The former is the preferable
view for it is unlikely that it was intended that the wife should be
taxed upon the rental value of the property in these circumstances.
ARREARAGES OF ALIMONY
Frequently, the husband will fall behind in his alimony pay-
ments and then liquidate the accrued amount by a lump sum pay-
ment. It has been held that such payments are to be treated as
periodic payments taxable to the wife and deductible by the hus-
band.6 1 This rule is also applicable to delinquent installments of
a principal sum payable over a period of more than ten years.
62
The ten percent rule is inapplicable in this case and the delinquent
and current installments will be taxable to the wife and deductible
by the husband in the year payment is made.
CASE COMMENT
COMMENT ON SCONCE V. NEECE: FEES TAIL, THE
RULE IN WILD'S CASE, A SIXTEEN DOLLAR QUESTION,
AND SOME COPARCENERS.-Sconce v. Neece I construed this
language: "I give, devise and bequeath all my estate, real, per-
sonal and mixed, to my daughters, Katie S. Pence and Lulu S.
Middleton, and the heirs of their body, share and share alike, pro-
vided that, if either of my said daughters shall not be living at
the date of my death, without any children surviving her, then,
I give, devise and bequeath all my estate aforesaid to the survivor."
Both daughters survived the testatrix and neither had had a
child. This circumstance seemed to permit court and counsel to
simplify the problem of construction by ignoring the proviso, and
upon this basis, the court's application of Chapter 159, section 1,
'35 C.S.A. and Chapter 40, section 7, '35 C.S.A. is orthodox, and
as to the land, conclusive.
2
However, it is more usual for the intention of the testator to
be sought by an analysis of all the language in the will.3 What
would have been the result if the proviso had been considered? It
says, ". . . if either of my daughters shall not be living at the
date of my death, without any children surviving her . . ." The first
61 Gale v. Comm'r, 191 F. (2d) 79 (2d Cir. 1951), affirming 13 T.C. 661 (1949).
2Reg. 118, §39.22(k)-1(c) (1) (1953).
16 Colo. Bar Assoc. Advance Sheets 271, 268 P. 2d 1102 (1954). The case is
not stated because it is assumed that the reader of this comment has read the
opinion.
' Anomalous section 47 of Chapter 40 says that "This article (including sec-
tion 7) shall not be so construed as to embrace last wills and testaments." This
observation was included in a comment on Liebhardt v. Avison, 28 Dicta 216.
Since that publication there has been an occasion to subject that comment to
careful review, but no occasion for any revision was found.
3 See, for example, Liebhardt v. Avison, 123 Colo. 338, 229 P. 2d 933 (1951).
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